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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Sajid Syed ("Syed") injured his back in January 1992, 
while working as a chemical operator for Hercules, Inc. 
("Hercules"). Syed brought this action under ERISA 
S 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. S 1132(a)(1)(B), alleging that 
Hercules denied him disability benefits owed under the 
company's employee benefits plan. In addition to damages, 
Syed requested the imposition of sanctions against 
Hercules for failure to provide him with the plan document 
pursuant to a written request, as required by ERISA 
S 502(c), 29 U.S.C. S 1132(c). He also sought redress for 
Hercules's failure to give him adequate written notice of the 
reasons for the denial of his claim, as required by ERISA 
S 503, 29 U.S.C. S 1133. Syed appeals the District Court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Hercules on all 
counts. We affirm. 
 
Hercules discharged Syed on March 4, 1992, effective 
March 31, 1992, as part of a reduction in force. Following 
his termination, Syed submitted a claim for long-term 
disability benefits under the Hercules Incorporated Income 
Protection Plan (the "Plan"). His claim was approved on 
June 18, 1993, and Syed began receiving benefits 
retroactive to April 1, 1992. 
 
Benefits are payable under the Plan when a worker 
becomes totally disabled and remains disabled for six 
consecutive months.1 See App. at B21. Because Syed was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. This six-month period, known as the "elimination period," was 
apparently not imposed by Provident in Syed's case. He began receiving 
benefits less than three months after his workplace accident. 
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under 62 when he started receiving benefits, he was eligible 
to receive benefits for as long as he remained totally 
disabled, up to age 65. See id. at B22. The Plan provides 
two definitions of total disability, one that applies for the 
first 24 months after the "elimination period" and another 
that applies thereafter. The Plan states: 
 
       During the elimination period, normally 6 months, and 
       the first 24 months of benefit payments, you are 
       considered totally disabled if you are not able to 
       perform your job. You must not engage in any work for 
       wages or profit during this time. 
 
       After receiving 24 monthly payments, you are 
       considered totally disabled for as long as you are not 
       able to engage in any employment for wage or profit for 
       which you are reasonably qualified by training, 
       education, or experience. 
 
App. at B24. 
 
After paying benefits to Syed for almost two years, 
Provident Life and Accident Insurance Co. ("Provident"), the 
Claims Fiduciary under the Plan, asked Syed to undergo an 
independent medical evaluation in February 1994 to 
determine if he was totally disabled under the latter 
definition. Dr. Joson, who performed the examination in 
March 1994, reported that Syed could not do heavy work, 
but that he could do "sedentary to light" work. App. at A4. 
Because Syed would no longer qualify for benefits after the 
24-month period lapsed, Provident notified Syed that his 
benefits would be terminated as of March 31, 1994. See id. 
at A6-7. 
 
Syed appealed the decision to terminate his disability 
benefits to Provident's ERISA Committee, which upheld its 
previous decision. See App. at A19-20. Syed renewed his 
appeal to the ERISA Committee on July 27 and October 28, 
1994, each time including updated medical reports. The 
ERISA Committee sent its final denial of benefits to Syed by 
letter dated November 9, 1994. On February 24, 1995, Syed 
requested a copy of the plan document that was effective as 
of the date he began receiving benefits. Hercules sent him 
a document entitled "Summary Plan Description" (SPD). 
App. at B15-32. 
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Syed filed suit on February 6, 1996 -- one year and 
eleven months after the initial denial of benefits on March 
31, 1994, and one year and three months after thefinal 
letter from Provident dated November 9, 1994. Shortly 
thereafter, he filed a motion for summary judgment seeking 
recovery of benefits under ERISA S 502(a)(1)(B), sanctions 
under S 502(c) for failure to produce the Plan document in 
response to a written request, and a remedy underS 503 
for failure to provide written notice of the reasons for 
termination of benefits. Hercules made a cross-motion for 
summary judgment, claiming that Syed owed money for 
overpayments made under the Plan. 
 
The District Court denied Syed's motion. As the Plan gave 
the Claims Fiduciary the exclusive discretion to deny claims 
for benefits, the District Court reviewed Syed'sS 502(a)(1)(B) 
claim under the abuse of discretion standard in accordance 
with Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 
115 (1989); see also Abnathya v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 2 
F.3d 40, 45 (3d Cir. 1993). After reviewing the medical 
evidence, the District Court found that there was a genuine 
issue as to whether Provident acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in terminating Syed's medical benefits. 
Nonetheless, after borrowing Delaware's one-year statute of 
limitations applicable to claims for "other benefits arising 
from . . . work, labor or personal services performed," 10 
Del. C. S 8111, the Court granted summary judgment for 
Hercules on this claim. 
 
Next, the Court dismissed Syed's S 502(c) claim. ERISA 
S 502(c) provides that an administrator must comply with a 
request for information by a plan participant and imposes 
personal liability for failure to do so. Syed contended that 
Hercules improperly sent him the SPD, rather than the 
Insurance Policy, see App. at B60, in response to his 
request. However, the Court held that the SPD was the 
operative plan document for the relevant time period and 
therefore granted summary judgment in favor of Hercules 
on this count. Likewise, the Court refused to remand Syed's 
case to the plan administrator for an out-of-time 
administrative appeal for the alleged violation of ERISA 
S 503, because Hercules's March 31 letter adequately set 
forth the reasons for denying Syed's benefits. 
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Syed makes four arguments on appeal. First, he contends 
that his ERISA claim for employee benefits should be 
governed by Delaware's three-year statute of limitations for 
contract actions, not the one-year statute for claims arising 
out of work, labor, or personal services performed. Second, 
he maintains that Hercules, as Plan Administrator, should 
be subject to sanctions for failing to provide proper 
disclosure as required by ERISA S 502(c). Third, Syed 
argues that Hercules violated ERISA S 503 both by failing to 
provide specific reasons for the denial of his claim and by 
neglecting to name any additional material or information 
that would have helped him perfect his claim. Finally, Syed 
asserts that the District Court should have exercised 
plenary review over the Claims Fiduciary's decision to deny 
his benefits, rather than reviewing for an abuse of 
discretion, as the Plan did not grant discretion to the 
Claims Fiduciary to make a disability determination. 
Because we hold that Delaware's one-year statute of 
limitations governs this action, we affirm the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment on Syed's S 502(a)(1)(B) 
claim without deciding whether Provident's decision to deny 
Syed's benefits was arbitrary and capricious. We likewise 
affirm the District Court's dismissal of Syed's claims under 
ERISA SS 502(c) and 503. 
 
ERISA S 502(a)(1)(B): Statute of Limitations 
 
The chief issue in this appeal concerns the statute of 
limitations that is applicable to Syed's claim for benefits 
under ERISA S 502(a)(1)(B).2 Unfortunately, ERISA does not 
provide a statute of limitations for suits brought under 
S 502(a)(1)(B) to recover benefits, and the new, general 
federal statute of limitations set out in 28 U.S.C.S 1658 
does not apply in this situation.3 Under these 
circumstances, courts generally turn to the most analogous 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We exercise plenary review over the District Court's choice of the 
applicable statute of limitations. See Nelson v. County of Allegheny, 60 
F.3d 1010, 1013 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
3. This provision, which prescribes a four-year limitations period, 
applies 
only to claims arising under acts of Congress enacted after December 1, 
1990. ERISA was enacted much earlier. 
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state statute of limitations. See DelCostello v. International 
Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158-60 (1983). Although 
this Circuit has not decided which state statute of 
limitations is applicable to ERISA S 502(a)(1)(B),4 every other 
circuit to address the issue has applied the statute of 
limitations for a state contract action. See Harrison v. 
Digital Health Plan, 183 F.3d 1235, 1239-40 (11th Cir. 
1999); Daill v. Sheet Metal Workers' Local 73 Pension Fund, 
100 F.3d 62, 65 (7th Cir. 1996); Adamson v. Armco, 44 
F.3d 650, 652 (8th Cir. 1995); Hogan v. Kraft Foods, 969 
F.2d 142, 145 (5th Cir. 1992); Meade v. Pension Appeals & 
Review Comm., 966 F.2d 190, 195 (6th Cir. 1992); Held v. 
Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corp., 912 F.2d 1197, 1207 
(10th Cir. 1990); Pierce County Hotel Employees & 
Restaurant Employees Health Trust v. Elks Lodge, 827 F.2d 
1324, 1328 (9th Cir. 1987); Dameron v. Sinai Hosp., 815 
F.2d 975, 981 (4th Cir. 1987). Because Delaware, in 
essence, has two statutes of limitation for contract 
disputes, however, we must determine which is more 
appropriate. 
 
Delaware Code S 8106 establishes a three-year statute of 
limitations for general actions on a promise. See Goldman 
v. Braunstein's, Inc., 240 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1968). Section 
8106 provides: 
 
       No action to recover damages for trespass, no action to 
       regain possession of personal chattels, . . . no action 
       based on a promise, . . . shall be brought after the 
       expiration of 3 years from the accruing of the cause of 
       such action. 
 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, S 8106 (emphasis added). Delaware 
also has a more specific statute of limitations covering 
employment disputes, S 8111, which provides: 
 
       No action for recovery upon a claim of wages, salary, or 
       overtime for work, labor or personal services 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We have previously suggested in dicta that the New Jersey state 
statute of limitations for a contract action would apply to claims under 
ERISA S 502(a)(1)(B), but we have never squarely decided the issue. See 
Connell v. Trustees of the Pension Fund of the Ironworkers Dist. Council 
of N. New Jersey, 118 F.3d 154, 156 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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       performed, . . . or for any other benefits arising from 
       such work, labor or personal services performed . . . 
       shall be brought after the expiration of one year from 
       the accruing of the cause of action on which such 
       action is based. 
 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, S 8111 (emphasis added). In this 
case, the District Court applied S 8111, relying on Mitchell 
v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 310 A.2d 641, 642 (Del. 
1973). 
 
In Mitchell, the Delaware Supreme Court applied S 8110 
(now S 8111) to a claim challenging the denial of benefits 
under a disability wage plan. See Mitchell, 310 A.2d at 642. 
The Court reasoned that the plan at issue was a"benefit" 
arising from work, labor, or services performed within the 
meaning of the statute because eligibility for the plan 
accrued from tenure on the job. See id. Although the 
District Court in the present case mistakenly referred to 
Mitchell as an ERISA case (Mitchell was decided in 1973 and 
ERISA was not effective until 1974), the application of 
S 8111's predecessor in the pre-ERISA context is strong 
evidence of its close relationship to the ERISA claim that 
Syed asserts. See also Sorenson v. Overland Corp., 142 F. 
Supp. 354, 360 (D. Del. 1956) ("The one year statute has a 
comprehensive sweep. It was intended to bar all claims 
arising out of the employer-employee relationship. The Act 
bars claims for `wages', `salary', and it likewise applies to 
`overtime' and to any other `benefits' arising from the 
corporate-officer employment relationship. The word 
`benefits' is embracing and covers all advantages growing 
out of the employment."). 
 
The Eighth Circuit dealt with a similar issue in Adamson 
v. Armco, 44 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1995). There, the Court had 
to choose between Minnesota's six-year statute of 
limitations governing general contract disputes and the 
state's two-year statute of limitations for wage claims. The 
Court reasoned that the wage-claim statute of limitations 
was the most analogous to the appellant's S 502(a)(1)(b) 
claim because Minnesota courts had uniformly applied that 
statute broadly to cover all damages arising out of the 
employment relationship. See Adamson, 44 F.3d at 652. In 
support of its conclusion, the Court noted that pre-ERISA 
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case law in Minnesota had applied the two-year statute of 
limitations to cases of unpaid benefits. See id. (citing 
Kohout v. Shakopee Foundry Co., 162 N.W.2d 237 (Minn. 
1968)). 
 
Syed relies primarily on two cases to bolster his 
argument for application of S 8106: Rich v. Zeneca, Inc., 845 
F. Supp. 162 (D. Del. 1994) and Shaw v. Aetna Life 
Insurance Co., 395 A.2d 384 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978). Rich 
held that S 8106 should apply to a claim under ERISA 
S 510, 29 U.S.C. S 1140, for wrongful termination based on 
a pension-defeating motive. See Rich, 845 F. Supp. at 166 
(citing Goldman v. Braunstein, Inc., 240 A.2d 577 (Del. 
1968)). The Rich Court chose S 8106 rather than S 8111 
because the latter applies to claims for breach of a promise 
to pay something already earned, whereas the former 
applies to claims for breach of a promise to pay what would 
have been earned had employment continued. See id. Since 
Syed's disability benefits were already "earned" through his 
period of employment at Hercules, Rich does not support 
the argument that S 8106 should apply here. 
 
In Shaw, the Delaware Superior Court refused to apply 
S 8111 where an employee brought an action under the 
employer's voluntary group accident insurance policy. 
Shaw, 395 A.2d at 385. The employee was injured in a 
workplace injury which resulted in his permanent and total 
disability. The employer argued that S 8111 should apply to 
the claim because coverage under the policy arose out of 
the employment relationship. See id. at 387 (relying on 
Mitchell). The Court dismissed defendant's argument 
summarily. See id. ("That contention of the defendant is 
without merit."). Instead, the Court applied Delaware's two- 
year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Del. 
Code S 8119. It is not immediately clear how Shaw is 
distinguishable from Syed's case, and Hercules has not 
pointed out any meaningful distinction. Nonetheless, 
because the Shaw Court failed to explain whyS 8111 
should not apply, we find Mitchell to be more persuasive. 
 
Although Syed's S 502(a)(1)(B) claim comes within 
Delaware's more specific statute of limitations for claims 
arising out of the employer-employee relationship, that does 
not conclusively resolve the issue. After all, the selection of 
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an appropriate statute of limitations is a question of federal 
law. See United Auto Workers v. Hoosier, 383 U.S. 696, 706 
(1966). 
 
Generally, we presume that Congress intended courts to 
apply the most closely analogous state statute of 
limitations. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 158. This principle 
rests on the assumption that "Congress would likely intend 
that courts follow their previous practice of borrowing state 
statutes." Id. at 158-59 n.12. We remain mindful of the 
Supreme Court's warning not to apply state statutes of 
limitation mechanically since "[s]tate legislatures do not 
devise their limitations periods with national interests in 
mind, and it is the duty of the federal courts to assure that 
the importation of state law will not frustrate or interfere 
with the implementation of national policies." Occidental 
Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977). 
Nonetheless, there is no reason to reject the state statute 
unless we find it "inconsistent with national labor policy." 
Auto Workers, 383 U.S. at 706. 
 
In this case, we recognize that the one-year statute of 
limitations of S 8111 is short, but we cannot say that it is 
inconsistent with the policy of ERISA. We therefore agree 
with the District Court that Syed's claim was governed by 
S 8111 and was thus barred. 
 
We are not persuaded by the arguments advanced by the 
dissent in support of its position that Syed's claim for 
disability benefits is more analogous to an ordinary 
contract claim, subject to S 8106, than to a claim for "other 
benefits arising from . . . work, labor or personal services," 
subject to S 8111. Noting that the Mitchell court described 
the plan at issue there as providing a "fringe benefit," the 
dissent argues that "Syed's claim . . . has little or nothing 
to do with work or services performed or fringe benefits 
. . . .," Dissent at 15, but this is simply not true. First, 
Syed's claim was squarely based on his prior employment. 
In order to qualify under the long term disability plan, he 
had to be "a regular, full-time non-represented employee of 
the Company . . . ." Appendix to Answering Brief at B20 
(Summary Plan Desciption). Second, ERISA benefits are 
often termed "fringe benefits." See, e.g., Bricklayers and 
Allied Craftsmen Int'l Union Local 33 Benefit Funds v. 
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America's Marble Source, Inc., 950 F.2d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 
1991).5 We are inclined to agree with the dissent that the 
one-year limitations period of S 8111 is not optimal, and we 
also believe that a uniform, national statute of limitations 
for claims such as Syed's would be beneficial. But forced to 
identify the most analogous Delaware statute of limitations, 
we agree with the District Court that S 8111 is the best fit.6 
 
ERISA S 502(c) 
 
Syed urges the Court to impose sanctions on Hercules for 
failing to provide the Plan document pursuant to a written 
request. ERISA S 502(c) provides that a plan administrator 
must comply with a request for information from a plan 
participant within 30 days or face personal liability, at the 
Court's discretion, of $100 a day from the date of the 
refusal. 29 U.S.C. S 1132(c). The District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to order sanctions against 
Hercules, and we affirm the grant of summary judgment on 
this issue. 
 
Hercules sent Syed the SPD on March 22, 1995, in 
response to his February 24, 1995, written request for "a 
complete copy of LTD Plan document effective as of March 
4, 1992." App. at A28. Syed contends that a different 
document was in effect at the time he was injured and at 
the time his benefits were denied. Specifically, he points to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We also note that Delaware's Wage Payment and Collection Act 
(WPCA), Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, SS 1101-1115, defines "benefits" as 
"compensation for employment other than wages, including, but not 
limited to, reimbursement for expenses, health, welfare or retirement 
benefits . . . ." Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, S 1109(b). Although the WPCA 
does 
not provide a statutory remedy for the denial of benefits, its definition 
quite clearly encompasses the disability benefits Syed has sued to 
recover here. 
 
6. In view of the dissent's reference (Dissent footnote 3) to the 
Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law, 43 P.S. S 260.1 et seq., 
which has a three-year statute, see 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 260.9a(g), 
we wish to make it clear that we express no view regarding the statute 
of limitations that would apply if a claim such as Syed's were brought in 
Pennsylvania. We note, however, that we have held that some ERISA 
claims are governed by the WCPL's statute of limitations and others are 
not. See Gluck v. Unisys Corp., 960 F.2d 1168, 1180-81 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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the insurance policy used to fund Hercules's long-term 
disability plan (LTD). App. at B35-72. 
 
A comparison of the SPD and LTD reveals no material 
differences between the two documents. Syed complains 
that he was not able to verify "whether the definition of 
disability is based on official plan language, SPD language, 
or some internal policy, written or unwritten." Appellant's 
Br. at 20. This argument lacks merit. For example, the 
March 31, 1994, letter denying Syed's benefits, see App. at 
A6, quotes the definition of total disability found at page 8 
of the SPD, see App. at B24. This definition is exactly the 
same as the definition of total disability found on page 3 of 
the LTD, see App. at B43, thus belying Syed's assertion 
that the two-tier definition of disability did not exist in the 
SPD, see Appellant's Br. at 22. The affidavit of Douglas Hill, 
Director of Employee Benefits for Hercules, makes clear 
that the document Hercules allegedly refused to send to 
Syed pursuant to his March 1995 request was, in fact, not 
executed until October 1995 (although it was effective 
retroactively to July 1990). Because the SPD and the LTD 
are identical in all respects material to this dispute, the 
District Court properly refused to impose sanctions against 
Hercules under ERISA S 502(c), 29 U.S.C. S 1132(c). 
 
ERISA S 503 
 
ERISA S 503 provides, in pertinent part, that every 
employee benefit plan shall: 
 
       provide adequate notice in writing to any participant or 
       beneficiary whose claim for benefits under the plan has 
       been denied, setting forth the specific reasons for such 
       denial, written in a manner calculated to be 
       understood by the participant. 
 
29 U.S.C. S 1133(1). Pursuant to this section, the Secretary 
of Labor has established that written notice of denial of a 
claim must: 
 
       provide to every claimant who has been denied a claim 
       for benefits written notice setting forth in a manner 
       calculated to be understood by the claimant: 
 
       (1) The specific reason or reasons for the denia l; 
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       (2) Specific reference to pertinent plan provisi ons on 
       which the denial is based; 
 
       (3) A description of any additional material or 
       information necessary for the claimant to perfect the 
       claim and an explanation of why such material or 
       information is necessary; and 
 
       (4) Appropriate information as to the steps to be taken 
       if the participant or beneficiary wishes to submit his or 
       her claim for review. 
 
29 C.F.R. S 2560.503-1(f). 
 
We have previously held that S 503 sets forth only the 
disclosure obligations of "the Plan" and that it does not 
establish that those obligations are enforceable through the 
sanctions of S 502(c). See Groves v. Modified Retirement 
Plan, 803 F.2d 109, 118 (3d Cir. 1986). Where a 
termination letter does not comply with the statutory and 
regulatory requirements, the time limits for bringing an 
administrative appeal are not enforced against the 
claimant. See Epright v. Environmental Resources 
Management, Inc. Health and Welfare Plan, 81 F.3d 335, 
342 (3d Cir. 1996). Thus, the remedy for a violation of S 503 
is to remand to the plan administrator so the claimant gets 
the benefit of a full and fair review. See Weaver v. Phoenix 
Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 990 F.2d 154, 159 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 
The March 31, 1994, letter from Provident to Syed began 
with a quotation from the Plan's definition of total 
disability. See App. at A6. Next, the letter explained 
that Syed's benefits were being terminated because the 
results of Dr. Joson's independent medical evaluation 
demonstrated that Syed was no longer totally disabled as 
the term was defined in the Plan. See App. at A6-7. The 
letter went on to identify several jobs for which Syed would 
be qualified given his present physical condition. See App. 
at A7. Provident stated that Syed could submit a request 
for reconsideration of the decision, accompanied by 
documents from Syed's physician. See id. Lastly, the letter 
noted that any information to be considered in connection 
with an appeal would have to be received within 60 days of 
Syed's receipt of the letter. See id. In short, Provident fully 
complied with the statutory and regulatory requirements for 
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notice under ERISA S 503, and Syed has not raised any 
genuine issue of material fact to the contrary. Accordingly, 
we affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment 
as to Syed's claim under ERISA S 503, 29 U.S.C. S 1133. 
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BARRY, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting. 
 
While I agree with much of the majority's opinion, I 
cannot agree with the conclusion that the most analogous 
state statute of limitations for a S 502(a)(1)(B) claim is found 
in Delaware's S 8111. It is on that issue, and that issue 
alone, that I dissent. 
 
First, it is clear, as the majority notes, that every circuit 
which has addressed this issue has applied the statute of 
limitations for a state contract action as most analogous to 
an ERISA claim for the denial of benefits. As the majority 
also notes, we, too, have suggested, albeit in dicta, that the 
state statute of limitations for a contract action would apply 
to claims under S 502(a)(1)(B). See Connell v. Trustees of the 
Pension Fund of the Ironworkers Dist. Council of Northern 
New Jersey, 118 F.3d 154, 156 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997). 
Moreover, district courts too numerous to mention have 
also concluded that a state contract statute of limitations is 
most analogous to a S 502(a)(1)(B) claim. This is, indeed, a 
resounding chorus. 
 
The rub here, however, is this. The majority concludes 
that "Delaware, in essence, has two statutes of limitations 
for contract disputes," specifically S 8106 and S 8111, and 
one, of course, must be selected. The majority then selects 
S 8111, which relates to claims "for wages, salary, or 
overtime for work, labor or personal services performed . . . 
or for any other benefits arising from such work, labor or 
personal services" as being "more specific" and, thus, most 
analogous to a claim for denied disability benefits under 
ERISA than S 8106, the statute traditionally used in 
Delaware for breach of contract, or breach of promise, 
actions. While I agree that S 8111 is "more specific," it 
simply does not apply to a claim that ERISA benefits were 
wrongly denied. 
 
Delaware courts restrict S 8111 and its one-year statute 
to work or services which have already been performed and 
apply S 8106 to a promise of compensation for work or 
services to be performed. The S 8111 action, in other words, 
is based on the services performed rather than on the 
original promise while the S 8106 action is based on the 
underlying promise with respect to services not yet 
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completed. See Goldman v. Braunstein's, Inc., 240 A.2d 
577, 578 (Del. 1968); Brown v. Colonial Chevrolet Co., 249 
A.2d 439, 441 (Del. Super. Ct. 1968).1  Moreover, benefits 
for work or services which have been performed have been 
described in the case on which the majority primarily relies 
as "fringe" benefits. Mitchell v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 
310 A.2d 641, 642 (Del. 1973). Claims for fringe benefits 
are typically governed by S 8111. See e.g. , Compass v. 
American Mirrex Co., 72 F. Supp. 2d 462, 467-68 (D. Del. 
1999)(claim for unpaid bonus governed by S 8111); SCOA 
Industries, Inc. v. Bracken, 374 A.2d 263, 264 (Del. 
1977)(claim for year-end bonus was equivalent of"wages" 
and governed by S 8111). 
 
In Mitchell, a pre-ERISA case, the Supreme Court of 
Delaware determined that Mitchell's action under 
Delaware's Disability Wage Plan was governed byS 8111. 
The Disability Wage Plan, however, had one and only one 
requirement for eligibility -- "at least one year of 
continuous service." The Plan was a "fringe benefit," said 
the Court, which accrued to Mitchell simply because she 
had worked for the one year -- her "work" had been 
"performed." Mitchell, 310 A.2d at 642. 
 
Syed's claim, however, has little or nothing to do with 
work or services performed or fringe benefits and has 
everything to do with benefits for disability based on an 
interpretation and analysis of the Plan documents, akin to 
the analysis required in a traditional breach of contract 
claim: 
 
       The [claimant] has brought this action to recover 
       benefits allegedly due him under the terms of the 
       employee pension benefit plan and to enforce and/or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. As the majority acknowledges, selecting the appropriate statute of 
limitations is a matter of federal, not state, law, and thus our task is 
not 
to predict which statute of limitations the Delaware Supreme Court 
might select for an ERISA claim. Rather, "in borrowing the state statute 
of limitations to impose a time limitation on the federal cause of action, 
the federal court is `closing the gap' left by Congress in order to 
fashion 
a body of federal common law to supplement the federal statutory cause 
of action." Harrison v. Digital Health Plan , 183 F.3d 1235, 1238-39 (11th 
Cir. 1999). 
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       clarify his rights under the terms of that Plan. The 
       employee pension benefit plan and its predecessor . . . 
       are in written form. Each of the Plans contain extensive 
       and detailed terms and conditions governing the rights 
       and duties of all participants in the fund. 
 
Jenkins v. Local 705 Int'l Bd. of Teamsters Pension Plan, 
713 F.2d 247, 252-53 (7th Cir. 1983); see also Hogan v. 
Kraft Foods, 969 F.2d 142, 145 (5th Cir. 1992)("[The] claim 
involves the interpretation of the annuity contract[.]"); 
Meade v. Pension Appeals and Review Comm., 966 F.2d 
190, 195 (6th Cir. 1992)("[T]he Plan at issue in this case 
constitutes a written contract [for disability benefits]."); 
Johnson v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of America, 942 F.2d 
1260, 1264 (8th Cir. 1991)(noting that life insurance policy 
governed by ERISA "is a written promise to pay money if a 
specified condition, accidental death, occurs in the future"). 
 
Here, as in Jenkins, it is the Plan which will dictate the 
outcome of Syed's claim for unpaid disability benefits.2 
There is simply no reasoned basis for concluding that fringe 
benefits given by the employer to the employee, i.e. 
"benefits arising from . . . work, labor or personal services 
performed," should be stretched to include the very 
different pension and health benefits governed by an ERISA 
plan that is subject to contract interpretation. 3 The 
majority's two-fold rejoinder to this is not persuasive. The 
majority misses the point by stating the hardly startling 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. It also bears mention that ERISA plans involve parties outside the 
employment relationship such as family members, the insurance 
company, and the plan administrator, and for that reason as well a 
S 502(a)(1)(B) claim does not fit squarely within S 8111. See Harrison, 
183 F.3d at 1241-42 (noting that ERISA claims may involve non-work 
related injuries or illnesses and, thus, concluding that state breach of 
contract statute was more analogous to S 502(a)(1)(B) claims than 
workers compensation statute). 
 
3. Pennsylvania has a similar statute, the Wage Payment and Collection 
Law, 43 P.S. S 260.1 et seq. See Ferguson v. Greyhound Retirement and 
Disability Trust, 613 F. Supp. 323, 324 (W.D. Pa. 1985)(rejecting use of 
wage statute -- and other statutes of limitations-- as most analogous 
and stating "[t]his is an action for recovery of benefits due under the 
terms of an employee pension benefit plan[.] We believe that the claim is 
most analogous to contract law."). 
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proposition that "Syed's claim was squarely based on his 
prior employment," "hardly startling" because Syed, of 
course, had to have been an employee to have brought an 
ERISA claim. Beyond that, the majority's citation to one 
case -- a preemption case which emanated from New 
Jersey, not Delaware -- for the proposition that ERISA 
benefits are "often" termed fringe benefits is somewhat 
disingenuous. The category of funds to which the New 
Jersey Construction Workers' Fringe Benefit Security Act at 
issue in that case applied consisted "largely if not entirely 
of employee benefit plans governed by ERISA." Bricklayers 
and Allied Craftsmen Int'l Union Local 33 Benefit Funds v. 
America's Marble Source Inc., 950 F.2d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 
1991). 
 
Mitchell aside, the majority also invokes a 1956 District of 
Delaware case which states that S 8111 is meant to 
encompass all disputes arising from the employment 
relationship. See Sorensen v. Overland Corp., 142 F. Supp. 
354 (D. Del. 1956), aff 'd, 242 F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1959). 
Separate and apart from the fact that this sweeping 
language emanates from a case decided long before ERISA 
was even a twinkle in Congress's eye, the statement which 
the majority quotes has been qualified in at least two post- 
ERISA District of Delaware cases. In Rich v. Zeneca, Inc., 
845 F. Supp. 162 (D. Del. 1994), relied on by Syed, the 
District Court found Mitchell and the "fairly broad" 
statement in Sorenson inapplicable to Rich's claim under 
ERISA that his employer wrongfully interfered with his 
attainment of pension and employment benefits: 
 
       S 8111 and its one year statute of limitations for wage, 
       salary and benefit claims should not be read as being 
       so comprehensive as to bar all claims arising out of the 
       employer-employee relationship. Rather [S 8111] is 
       directed to claims alleging a breach of a duty to pay 
       wages, salary or overtime for work performed. Where, 
       as here, a plaintiff alleges that a defendant has 
       breached a different duty arising out of the employer- 
       employee relationship, another statute of limitations 
       may apply to the plaintiff 's claim. 
 
Rich, 845 F. Supp. at 165. The Court concluded that Rich's 
claims were most analogous to the breach of contract and 
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breach of promise claims asserted in Goldman and Brown 
and, thus, subject to the S 8106 three-year statute of 
limitations. See id. at 165-66. Parenthetically, the 
majority's effort to distinguish Rich by shoe-horning Syed's 
case into "work performed" because his benefits have been 
"earned" makes no sense both on its face and because 
those contracted-for benefits can only be "earned" when 
certain criteria -- criteria stated in the Plan-- are met, a 
finding which cannot now be made.4 
 
In the second post-ERISA District of Delaware case, the 
Court, referencing what it called the "broad interpretation" 
of S 8111 in Sorensen, found that the bonus at issue -- a 
clear "fringe" benefit -- was subject toS 8111's one-year 
statute of limitations. The Court summarized the 
distinction between S 8106 and S 8111: 
 
       If a plaintiff alleges a breach of a duty to provide 
       benefits or to pay wages for work already performed, 
       then the one year statute of limitations in section 8111 
       governs. On the other hand, if plaintiff alleges that his 
       employer breached a different duty arising out of the 
       employment agreement, then the three year statute of 
       limitations in section 8106 applies. 
 
Compass, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 467. Just such a"different 
duty" has been alleged here. See also DeWitt v. Penn-Del 
Directory Corp., 872 F. Supp. 126, 134-35 (D. Del. 
1994)(S 8106 is the most analogous statute of limitations 
for ERISA S 510 claim). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The majority rejects a second case relied on by Syed primarily because 
the Court in that case did not explain why it foundS 8111 inapplicable 
to a claim brought under a group accident insurance policy for personal 
injuries resulting in disability. See Shaw v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 395 
A.2d 
384 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978). It is very clear, however, why the Shaw Court 
found as it did: the very specific two-year statute of limitations for 
personal injury claims was the perfect fit. I note, for what it is worth, 
that by virtue of subsequent amendments to the personal injury 
protection ("PIP") provisions of Delaware's No Fault Insurance Statute, 
actions for PIP benefits are now statutory causes of action, subject to 
the 
three-year statute of limitations of S 8106. See Harper v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 703 A.2d 136 (Del. 1997). 
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Finally, the majority cites a 1995 Eighth Circuit case 
which applied Minnesota's two-year statute of limitations 
for wage claims as more analogous to a S 502(a)(1)(B) claim 
than the six-year statute of limitations governing contract 
disputes. See Adamson v. Armco, Inc., 44 F.3d 650 (8th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 823 (1995). Conceding that 
Minnesota courts have not had occasion to determine 
whether claims for employee benefits under an ERISA plan 
are wage claims, the Adamson Court found the issue 
"hardly in doubt," but cited in support of its"hardly in 
doubt" conclusion only pre-ERISA cases involving claims 
not for disability benefits but for unpaid vacation benefits, 
salary increases and "adjustment of all fringe benefits." 447 
F.3d at 653. Hardly ringing support. 
 
It is, thus, clear, at least to me, that S 8106's statute of 
limitations for contract actions is more analogous to an 
ERISA claim for the denial of benefits than that found in 
S 8111.5 Moreover, in our search for the most analogous 
statute, we are not necessarily limited to reviewing the two 
presented to us. It might well be appropriate, therefore, to 
consider Delaware's three-year statute of limitations for 
claims alleging breach of insurance policies, 19 Del. C. 
S 3315. Other circuits have concluded that similar state 
statutes are the most analogous to S 502(a)(1)(B) claims and 
supply the appropriate statute of limitations. See, e.g., Lang 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. I note in passing, and only in passing because the parties have not 
discussed it, that S 8106 also provides a statute of limitations for 
"action[s] based on a statute". Delaware courts have applied the 
provision to S 8106/S 8111 disputes. See Johnson v. Williams, 728 A.2d 
1185, 1188-89 (Del. Super. Ct. 1998)(concluding that lower court's use 
of S 8106 where fireman sought line-of-duty disability benefits pursuant 
to state statute as an "action based on statute" was not clearly 
erroneous); Vassallo v. Haber Elec. Co., 435 A.2d 1046, 1051 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 1981)(applying S 8106 to plaintiff 's claim that based on a 
state statute he should have been registered by employer to receive 
higher wages). Section 8106 has also been found to provide the statute 
of limitations for a federal RICO claim, a claim"based on a statute." See 
Creamer v. General Teamsters Local Union 326, 579 F. Supp. 1284, 1290 
(D. Del. 1984). Syed's claim is indisputably based on a statute -- ERISA 
-- and because the more specific S 8111 simply does not apply, S 8106 
is arguably a more appropriate candidate for the most analogous statute 
of limitations for this reason as well. 
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v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d 1102, 1104 (10th Cir. 1999) 
("Our duty . . . is to choose the most analogous state 
statute of limitation. While plaintiff 's ERISA claim is based 
upon a contract, it is more precisely based upon a contract 
of insurance. Therefore, we hold that the three-year statute 
of limitations applies to plaintiff 's claim."); Nikaido v. 
Centennial Life Ins. Co., 42 F.3d 557, 559 (9th Cir. 
1994)(using California's "limitations statute specifically for 
disability policies" rather than general breach of contract 
statute where ERISA Plan contained provision similar to 
that of California's insurance code); Duchek v. Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield of Nebraska, 153 F.3d 648, 649-50 (8th 
Cir. 1998)(applying Nebraska Insurance Statute to action 
for benefits under ERISA). As the Duchek Court put it: 
 
       [I]t would be anomalous to characterize this suit as a 
       contract action and then borrow Nebraska's generic 
       contract statute of limitations rather than the specific 
       section of the Nebraska insurance laws permitting the 
       contractual limitation in question. 
 
153 F.3d at 649-50. 
 
The majority, after concluding that Syed's claim comes 
within S 8111's statute of limitations, recognizes that that 
does not conclusively resolve the issue because the selected 
statute of limitations must not be "inconsistent with 
national labor policy." It is, indeed, quite clear that a state's 
statute of limitations for ERISA claims will only be 
borrowed "so long as application of state statute's time 
period would not impede effectuation of federal policy." 
Pierce County Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees 
Health Trust v. Elks Lodge, 827 F.2d 1324, 1328 (9th Cir. 
1987); see also Jenkins, 713 F.2d at 251 ("In determining 
the most appropriate state statute of limitations, the court 
must be cognizant of and examine the underlying nature of 
the federal claim as well as the federal policies involved."). 
The majority, while finding S 8111's one-year statute of 
limitations to be "short," and while choosing not to discuss 
the policy behind ERISA, simply concludes that it"cannot 
say" the one-year statute of limitations is inconsistent with 
that policy. That conclusion is not so clear to me. 
 
In enacting ERISA, "Congress sought to protect the 
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interests of participants in employee benefits plans by 
regulating the administration of such plans and by 
providing participants and beneficiaries with a variety of 
remedies to assure compliance with the statutory 
framework." Harrison, 183 F.3d at 1239; see also Held v. 
Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corp., 912 F.2d 1197, 1202 
(10th Cir. 1990)("The principal purpose of ERISA is to 
protect employees' rights to benefits under a covered 
plan."). While I cannot say that applying S 8111's one-year 
statute of limitations (which, it must be remembered, bars 
Syed's claim) is so unreasonable as to impede the 
effectuation of federal policy, I surely cannot say that we 
are furthering Congress's clearly stated goal by concluding 
that Delaware's employees have a much shorter period of 
time within which to file claims for the wrongful denial of 
benefits than employees in virtually every other state.6 
Perhaps the Delaware Legislature will feel obliged to 
consider this unfortunate result. See Johnson , 942 F.2d at 
1266 ("Either Congress, by amending ERISA, or the 
Missouri Legislature is free to modify the statute of 
limitations. Until such legislative action, we are required to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. See e.g., Carey v. Int'l Broth. of Elec. Workers Local 363 Pension 
Plan, 
201 F.3d 44, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1999)(applying New York's six-year 
limitations period); Lang, 196 F.3d at 1104 (applying Utah's three-year 
limitations period); Harrison, 183 F.3d at 1239-40 (applying Georgia's 
six-year limitations period); Duchek, 153 F.3d at 649-50 (applying 
Nebraska's three-year limitations period); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 
Alabama v. Sanders, 138 F.3d 1347, 1357 (11th Cir. 1998)(applying 
Alabama's six-year limitations); Daill, 100 F.3d at 65 (applying Illinois' 
ten-year limitations period); Nikaido, 42 F.3d at 559 (applying 
California's three-year limitations period); Hogan, 969 F.2d at 145 
(applying Texas' four-year limitations period); Johnson, 942 F.2d at 1263 
(applying Missouri's ten-year limitations period); Meade 966 F.2d at 193, 
195 (applying Ohio's fifteen-year limitations period); Wright v. 
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 925 F.2d 1288, 1291 (10th Cir. 
1991)(applying Oklahoma's five-year limitations period); Pierce, 827 F.2d 
at 1328 (applying Washington's six-year limitations period); Hawaii 
Carpenters Trust Funds v. Waiola Carpenter Shop, Inc., 823 F.2d 289, 
297-98 (9th Cir. 1987)(applying Hawaii's six-year limitations period); 
Dameron v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 815 F.2d 975, 981-82 (4th Cir. 
1987)(applying Maryland's three-year limitations period); Trustees for 
Alaska Laborers-Constr. Indus. Health and Sec. Fund v. Ferrell, 812 F.2d 
512, 517 (9th Cir. 1987)(applying Alaska's six-year limitations period). 
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hold, consistent with Missouri law, that plaintiff 's claim to 
enforce defendant's written promise for the payment of 
money is governed by the ten-year statute of limitations."). 
 
One final note. The Supreme Court of Delaware has 
instructed that when a Delaware court is in doubt as to 
which of two statutes of limitations control, it should 
choose the longer. See Sonne v. Sacks, 314 A.2d 194, 196 
(Del. 1973). Indeed, we, ourselves, have recognized this 
principle in a diversity case dealing with an S 8106 and 
S 8111 dispute. See Lindsey v. M.A. Zeccola & Sons, Inc., 26 
F.3d 1236, 1245 (3d Cir. 1994). Although we, of course, are 
not bound to follow that sensible instruction, choosing the 
concededly applicable longer statute of limitations period 
would not only further the federal policy behind ERISA but 
would bring Delaware into line with all of the other states 
in which substantially longer statutes of limitations are 
applied than the one-year period deemed applicable here. I 
respectfully dissent. 
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